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When Worlds Collide: What are the obligations of
the NHS at the interface between data protection
and freedom of information regimes?
On 11 January 2005, ten days after the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002
(FOISA) came into force, the Common Services Agency for the Scottish Health
Service (CSA) received a request for information on incidences of childhood
leukaemia, in the range of 0–14 years, by year and census ward from 1990 to 2003 for
the Dumfries and Galloway postal areas. The CSA refused the request on a number of
grounds: that the combination of the rare diagnosis, specified age group, small
geographical area and low numbers meant that individuals could be identified—the
information therefore fell within the definition of “personal data” under the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and should not be disclosed, “personal data” being an
exempt category of information under FOISA; that having never carried out the
analysis of the data by census ward the CSA did not hold the data requested; and that
the CSA had a duty of confidence equivalent to that of the clinicians to whom the
information were originally disclosed (and on whose behalf CSA were acting as
custodians of the data). The applicant, Mr Collie, did not respond to invitations to
discuss accepting alternative data or to address his needs in other ways. After request-
ing that the CSA review its decision and receiving the same response he then turned to
the Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) for a ruling.1
While accepting that the requested data constituted personal data under the DPA,
the SIC nevertheless ruled that a perturbed, “barnardised” version of the requested
table—that is, one that involved changing small figures by adding 0, +1 or -1 in an
attempt to maintain anonymity—could have been provided. On this basis the SIC held
that the CSA was in breach of FOISA because it had not provided sufficient advice and
assistance to Mr Collie as to what information it was able to supply as required under
section 15 of the Act. The CSA has decided to appeal this decision and the case will
now go to the Court of Session in Edinburgh.
The Collie case is the first decision to explore the interface between data protection
and freedom of information with an impact on healthcare.2 It involves the inter-
pretation of freedom of information provisions that are more or less standards across
the whole of the United Kingdom3 and its ultimate resolution therefore has potentially
wide-ranging implications. It raises significant policy issues and has the potential to
create a dangerous and onerous precedent for public authorities in the health sector
that are charged, simultaneously, with protecting patient data and complying with
provisions of freedom of information legislation.
1 Decision of the Scottish Information Commissioner, Mr Michael Collie and the Common Services
Agency for the Scottish Health Service, 15 Aug 2005, available at http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/.
2 For an overview in the healthcare context, see B Meredith, “Data protection and freedom of informa-
tion” (2005) 330 British Medical Journal 490-91.
3 The legislation in England and Wales is the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
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The aim of the data protection regime as it relates to healthcare is to protect patient
privacy by regulating the processing of “personal data”, defined as data which relate to
an individual and from which the individual can be identified, either from one set of
data or when data sets are linked.4 Identifiability is, therefore, a crucial concept, and
the obvious consequence is that if the processing of data cannot lead to the
identification of a specific individual the provisions of data protection law do not apply.
The most commonly recognised mechanism to avoid identifiability—and therefore the
terms of the law—is anonymisation. But what counts as legally acceptable levels of
anonymisation remains unclear.5 While it is accepted that the law does not require
absolute anonymity to be achieved—that is, that a link can never again be made
between data and individual—relative anonymity is, as its name suggests, a relative
matter entailing varying degrees of risk of identification depending on the circum-
stances of a given case.6 It was just such a concern that preoccupied the CSA, which has
argued that the application of the particular type of “barnardisation” the SIC seeks to
impose is not enough to anonymise the data in this case to an acceptable degree. The
fear is one of connectivity of data, that is, that there remains a significant degree of risk
that the data revealed in the statistical table might, on release, be easily linked to other
data in a manner that would point to individuals who have suffered from leukaemia.
This reflects the spirit of the data protection regime, which engenders a culture of
caution, and where non-disclosure of personal data is the order of the day.
The spirit of the freedom of information regime is diametrically opposed to such a
culture. It imposes obligations of transparency, openness and ease of access on public
authorities. Here, the information to which there is a right of access is, simply,
information held by, or on behalf of, a Scottish public authority.7 This, of course, does
not apply to all information so held, and the relevant exemption in the present context
is that concerning “personal data” as defined by reference to the DPA.8 Requests for
access to such data need not be complied with. If they come from the data subject
herself they must be handled according to the data protection regime as a “subject
access request”. Moreover, if a public authority receives such a subject access request
from within the freedom of information regime it must, nevertheless, process that
request as subject to data protection. Thus, it would seem that the statutes draw a clear
line in the sand as between their respective competencies.
The Collie case demonstrates all too well, however, how the respective regimes
cannot be kept entirely apart. There is, in fact, a potential clash of cultures between, on
the one hand, a world where the default position is non-disclosure and another where
the expectation is that access should be given. The tension at the interface between these
two worlds increases depending on where the expectations are set that public authori-
ties will facilitate access to information that they hold. This distils into what is meant by
4 DPA, s 1(1).
5 For a useful discussion see W Lowrance, Learning from Experience: Privacy and the Secondary Use of
Data in Health Research (2002).
6 See, e.g., the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on Regulations for Automated Medical Databanks
(No R(81)1) and the Council of Europe Recommendation on the Protection of Medical Data (1997, No
R(97)5).
7 FOISA, s 3(2).
8 FOISA, s 38.
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the obligation both north and south of the border “… to provide advice and assistance
to a person who proposes to make, or has made, a request for information to it”.9
What sort of advice and assistance must, then, be provided? The UK Information
Commissioner’s Office issued Guidance in October 2004 suggesting a casuistic (case-
by-case) approach and recommending dialogue with the applicant to make the best
assessment of his or her needs. In the instant case the applicant failed to respond to
offers to discuss the issue, and one might expect this to have been the end of the
matter. Importantly, the Guidance states:
In general there will be no additional burden involved in the provision of advice and
assistance as it is essentially a matter of customer service. This will mean that the duty to
provide advice and assistance under the Act will much of the time be fulfilled by the delivery
of an authority’s usual customer service standards.10
The interpretation by the Scottish Information Commissioner in Collie, however,
seems far to exceed these parameters. While it was confirmed that the information
requested constituted “personal data” and that it would be a breach of the DPA to
release the data requested by the applicant, the CSA was none the less found to be in
breach of FOISA because it was held that the CSA had failed in its obligations to advise
and assist by refusing to disclose perturbed data as an alternative to the actual data
requested.
This may be a reasonable compromise at first blush: if personal data can be
adequately anonymised so as to take them out of the data protection regime then there
is no reason why they should not then be made public. But this ruling is based on a
number of underlying assumptions which, if allowed to become established prece-
dents, would have deleterious and far-reaching consequences.
First, is it the case that mere perturbation of data of this kind is enough to meet the
requirements of relative anonymity and non-identifiability? The SIC was content to
assume that the risk of identification would be “substantially removed” by these
means. But this raises the question of what is required in law to ensure an acceptable
level of anonymisation. There is, in fact, no clear legal ruling on the matter, although
the UK Information Commissioner has issued guidance to the effect that it is “…
incumbent on anyone processing data to take such technical and organisational
measures as are necessary to ensure that data cannot be reconstituted to become
personal data and to be prepared to justify any decision they make…”11 This points to
the problem of addressing the unknown risk that data may indeed be “reconstituted”
once in the hands of a third party because of the possibility of connecting the disclosed
(anonymised) data with other data held by, or accessible to, that party. Data protection
culture would have us err on the side of caution.
This also reveals another clash of cultures between data protection and freedom of
information. Whereas under the former regime it is possible to seek written assurances
concerning the uses to which disclosed data may be put and so potentially limit
connectivity of various data sets, the freedom of information regime expressly
9 FOISA, s 15(1). The equivalent provision in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is s 16.
10 Information Commissioner’s Office, Freedom of Information Awareness Guidance No 23 (Oct 2004) 2.
11 Information Commissioner’s Office, Legal Guidance (2000) 14.
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prohibits public authorities seeking any information about the reasons behind an
access request or the possible uses of disclosed information.12 In fact there is an
established set of procedures for those wishing access to data held by CSA on behalf of
NHS Scotland. Researchers and others have always been required to obtain approval
from a research ethics committee for access to data for research—this ensures that the
purpose is justified and ethical. When access to personal data is required they have
further been required to apply for approval to a Privacy Advisory Committee whose
purpose is to ensure that legal and professional guidance is being adhered to. This
possible route to obtaining the data was pointed out to the applicant but no response
was received. Thus this decision by the SIC appears to undermine well-established
safeguards put in place to ensure the legal ethical use of health data in research.
The SIC’s interpretation of the duty to provide advice and assistance is potentially
very wide and costly. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office has made it clear
that the duty is to assist applicants in the process of their request for information, for
example, by helping them to formulate that request or by directing them to another
body that may hold the relevant information. In our opinion the Collie case confuses
this procedural duty with a duty to provide information generally; but that cannot be
the nature of the duty to advise and assist, since this is the entire objective of the
freedom of information legislation itself. The duty to advise and assist must concern
something complementary to the general obligation; otherwise it is redundant in terms
of the broader objective of the law. Moreover, the Collie ruling conflates the duty to
disclose what you hold with a duty to disclose what you can; importantly, the specific
data that were the subject of this request were not “held” by the CSA. Further analysis
was required of various datasets to generate the information in the form requested,
entailing further costs and man-hours of research. Thus, while the information could
be collated, a decision that it should be collated raises the question of whether this is an
appropriate use of freedom of information procedures, and how far, now, the duty to
assist will extend. In particular, such an interpretation of this statutory duty, in the light
of concerns about disclosing personal data, runs the risk of rubbing out the clear line in
the sand between the realms of freedom of information and data protection.
Broader issues are also at stake in the no man’s land between these two realms. For
instance, the CSA pointed to the public interest in maintaining public trust and
confidence in a public authority that is a custodian of health data. There is a genuine
concern that this might suffer as a result of disclosure orders. If a public authority’s
ability to protect the identity of data subjects is weakened then the public may be less
sanguine about allowing that public authority to process their data. This might in turn
have important consequences in medical research, for example, concerning the
completeness and reliability of data in cancer registries. A decrease in data flow to such
registries could not possibly be in the public interest. Yet, while the SIC acknowledged
public interest arguments, he pointed to the technicality of the exemption relied upon
by CSA. This is an absolute exemption under FOISA which does not require an appeal
to the public interest to justify its application. It is to be contrasted with qualified
exemptions—for example where disclosure might endanger a person’s safety or
12 UK Information Commissioner, Freedom of Information Awareness Guidance No 23 (Oct 2004) 2.
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physical or mental health13—which only apply if it is in the public interest for them to
do so. We would simply point out that public interests permeate FOI legislation, DPA,
and most particularly the common law of confidentiality, where the courts have
repeatedly pointed to the need to consider the public interest in maintaining patient
privacy and in being seen to do so.14 The interconnectedness of these fields requires
further exploration, and even the SIC himself expressly acknowledged the overlap
between data protection and the common law.15
A final point concerns liability. FOI legislation protects public authorities against
civil actions for failure to disclose information,16 but it says nothing about exempting
them from liability arising from disclosure where an action could still be raised under
DPA by the subject of personal data released contrary to that Act.17
The test case of Collie will serve as a very important signpost for the future direction
of freedom of information obligations, but as this short commentary demonstrates, the
interface between the worlds of freedom of information and data protection remains
largely unexplored.
Graeme Laurie
Professor of Medical Jurisprudence
 University of Edinburgh
Renate Gertz
Research Fellow
AHRC Research Centre for Studies in
Intellectual Property and Technology Law
 University of Edinburgh
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Is the Disability Discrimination Act Discriminatory?
A. INTRODUCTION
The experience of litigants has shown that it is extremely difficult for those with a
mental illness to fulfil the requisite requirements to be classified as disabled in terms of
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995). This raises the question as to
whether the DDA 1995 is itself discriminatory, in the sense that it is easier for someone
with a physical impairment to meet its conditions than someone with a mental
impairment. Historically, the lack of attention given to “psychiatric disability” means
that disability law, policy and practice has developed more with physical rather than
13 FOISA, s 39.
14 See X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. and more recently Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers plc [2004] 2 AC
457.
15 Note 1 above, para 102.
16 FOISA, s 55.
17 DPA, s 3.
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